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Abstract:  Television has been a staple of the American lifestyle since its adoption in the 
1950s. Advertising has been the primary source of revenue for local stations, although 
many stations strengthened their bottom line with compensations paid by their parent 
network. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, local broadcast stations were faced with a 
more fragmented audience due to the rapid growth of cable television. National networks 
stopped compensating local broadcast stations in the early 2000s, making it more difficult 
for local broadcast stations to maintain their revenue streams and profit margins. 
 In 1992 Congress created retransmission consent to ensure that broadcasters 
would be able to negotiate with cable and satellite operators for fair compensation for 
their programming. Cable operators resist retransmission compensation, saying it has 
raised programming costs and resulted in higher prices for consumers. The higher costs 
are passed along to consumers in the form of subscriber fees. Many politicians, 
consumers, and industry groups have been concerned about the high prices of cable 
television service and have been researching ways to reduce fees. One alternative to high 
subscriber fees is offering channels a la carte or on an individual basis. A mandated a la 
carte delivery option would significantly change the way cable operators and local 
broadcast stations would negotiate retransmission compensation. 
 The major findings in this study include the significance retransmission fees have 
on the financial health of local television stations, the importance of retransmission 
negotiations between cable operators and local broadcast stations and the impact offering 
programming a la carte could have on local broadcast television. 
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 CHAPTER I 
 
A LA CARTE CABLE PRICING AND THE FUTURE  
OF LOCAL BROADCAST TELEVISION 
  
 
 Since the establishment of local broadcast television in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
television has played a major role in the American lifestyle. Each week viewers across the nation 
would wait patiently for their favorite programs to be broadcast on local stations. Often entire 
families would gather in front of their sets to catch their favorite programs such as I Love Lucy, 
The Ed Sullivan Show, and Gunsmoke (tv.com, 2015).  
 The three national networks that emerged, including the American Broadcast Company 
(ABC), National Broadcast Company (NBC) and Columbia Broadcast System (CBS), supplied 
local stations with programming. In exchange for airing those programs, local stations received 
money from the networks called compensation. “In larger markets, the networks provided only a 
fraction of an affiliate’s overall revenues, while in smaller markets, network compensation 
contributed as much as twenty-five to thirty percent of revenues” (Blumenthal & Goodenough, 
2006, p. 9). The network payments to medium and small stations were extremely important and 
helped local broadcasters fund news and public affairs programming to better serve the public 
interest (Prato, 1992). 
 Network compensation, combined with local advertising income, had been the primary 
sources of revenue for local broadcast stations since the beginning of the industry. Audience 
ratings (the basis for establishing advertising rates) translated directly into revenue for local  
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television programming services, but in the late 1980s and early 1990s, local audience ratings 
started declining, causing a direct revenue decline. During this time, national networks also began 
phasing out compensation to local broadcast stations, making it even more difficult for stations to 
maintain their profit margins. New competition (i.e., advertising moving to the Internet) coupled 
with the elimination of network compensation created financial losses and forced local broadcast 
stations to seek other revenue opportunities to continue operations and stay profitable. 
 One new source of revenue would be from cable and satellite companies carrying local 
station signals. “In the early 2000s, local broadcasters began to negotiate retransmission consent 
agreements that included monetary compensation with DBS operators, telephone companies 
entering the video market, and ultimately cable operators” (Eisenach, 2009, p. 9). In the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection Act (Cable Act) of 1992, Congress gave broadcasters the right to 
negotiate with cable systems for reasonable compensation (retransmission consent), or 
alternatively to require cable systems to carry their signals on an uncompensated basis, known as 
must carry. Retransmission consent simply provided broadcasters with a means of obtaining an 
economically efficient level of compensation for their broadcast signals (“Cable Act,” 1992). 
Broadcasters began aggressively pursuing retransmission consent payments to replace network 
compensation losses and to transition to a business model more akin to that of basic cable 
networks, which have long relied on both subscriber fees and advertising revenue (Napoli, 2011). 
Together with advertising revenue, retransmission compensation provided a dual revenue stream 
for television stations. This dual revenue stream has leveled the economic playing field between 
cable operators and local broadcasters, which was one of the goals of the Cable Act of 1992 
(Eisenach, 2009).  
 As local broadcasters started collecting retransmission fees, the rush to acquire local 
television stations by media companies spiked in the 2010s. Consolidation has resulted in 589 
local broadcast stations in the hands of just 12 media companies. Ten of the 12 companies 
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reported revenue growth though the third quarter of 2014 (January-September) compared with the 
same period a year earlier (Matsa, 2014).  
 Even with the strong financial payoffs for media consolidation, the exponential growth of 
online streaming has made an impact on the way viewers consume media and has presented a 
new challenge to local broadcasters. On October 15th and 16th, 2014, Home Box Office (HBO), 
the most critically acclaimed cable network, and CBS, the most watched broadcast network, bet 
on the future of selling a subscription service for the delivery of its television content. These two 
new Internet streaming services bypass cable television and deliver content directly for those who 
want to pay for the service. Derek Thompson of The Atlantic suggested that in less than 24 hours 
the future of television delivery may have unfolded right in front of our eyes (Thompson, 2014).  
This type of a la carte service could someday bypass network affiliates as well as cable and 
satellite service providers and give major broadcast and cable networks a direct route to viewers, 
revolutionizing the way television is delivered and paid for (Stelter & Pallotta, 2014). 
 As noted by the actions of HBO and CBS, video consumption habits appear to be 
changing at an accelerating rate. Technology-savvy Millennials are leading the way, a generation 
that wants to watch when they want, what they want and where they want. To stay competitive 
with new direct to the home technology, local broadcast stations and cable systems may have to 
alter the way they deliver content to the home. Heuman (2011) expressed the following in regard 
to user control and empowerment associated with changing viewing habits: 
 The idea of a “channel” is soon to be obsolete. What we need is a la carte  
 selection of individual programs (programs after all is what we watch, not 
 channels). Video on demand technology is rapidly being developed. The  
 future is everything on demand. Forget channels; they will be interesting 
 artifacts by the time the wheels of government rulemaking grind out a 
 decision on a la carte channel selection (p. 49). 
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Heuman’s view demonstrated that viewers no longer need to accept a prescribed time for viewing 
programs as access to video content has become a matter of using one of several interfaces 
capable of delivering a la carte content anytime and anywhere (Frieden, 2011). A la carte, or per-
channel programming, means a channel is offered on an individual per-channel basis rather than 
as part of a bundle or tier of programming (“Must-Carry/Retransmission Consent Election,” 
2013).  
 Local broadcasters are facing unprecedented competitive pressures and an uncertain 
future. The shift in consumer behavior toward digital and online platforms presents a challenge to 
the current regulatory system of retransmission compensation between cable operators and local 
broadcasters. According to cable operators, the retransmission consent scheme is broken. 
Broadcasters contend, however, that the retransmission consent scheme is working as intended 
(Burton, 2012). The marketplace for programming is rapidly evolving to the next level. Cable 
companies and local broadcasters have something to fear from the rise in content streaming 
services. To compete in today’s television marketplace, cable systems may be forced to offer 
channels a la carte, which could change the economics of the television business, including the 
way content owners and local broadcast stations negotiate for distribution with cable systems. 
With ongoing disputes between cable systems and local television stations regarding 
retransmission compensation, it is important to study the issue of retransmission consent and the 
future of local broadcast television. This study utilized a survey of general managers of local 
broadcast stations. The study focused on three distinct areas of the television business. First, the 
researcher examined how retransmission fees have impacted the financial health of local 
broadcast stations. Second, the researcher examined the economics of retransmission fees and the 
issues of negotiating retransmission consent for local broadcasters. Third, the researcher studied 
how a la carte offerings would affect a local station’s financial health vis-a-vis the value of the 
retransmission fee. 
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Intended benefits of the study included (a) obtaining a better understanding of how 
retransmission fees have impacted the financial health of local broadcast stations and recognizing 
the importance retransmission fees have on a station’s revenue projections; (b) ascertaining what 
criteria is used in determining market value for a local broadcast stations programming, including 
what role station ratings play in negotiating retransmission compensation; and (c) what effect 
offering programming a la carte would have on retransmission negotiations and ultimately impact 
a station’s value. The study may also be used as a tool to better understand how video content 
will be consumed in the future.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review 
of studies of the broadcast television and cable industries and outlines a series of research 
questions. Section 3 explains the methodology of the study, and discusses how the survey was 
carried out. Section 4 discusses the findings of the research. Section 5 offers a discussion about 
the results and their implications.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 As stated in the introduction, this research focuses on the impact of retransmission fees 
for local television stations, how a la carte delivery of programming could impact that industry, 
and how delivering programing a la carte could change the economics of the television business, 
including the way local broadcast stations negotiate for distribution with cable systems. Four 
specific themes are presented in this literature review: (a) the case for retransmission consent, (b) 
the economics of retransmission fees, (c) the drivers of a la carte pricing, and (d) issues regarding 
a la carte pricing. 
The Case for Retransmission Consent 
 Cable television grew rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s and progressed from a 
simple delivery service to a video information and entertainment provider. Cable’s early growth 
was attributed to cable operators’ ability to pick up broadcast signals from hundreds of miles 
away, providing customers with new programming choices (“The Evolution,” 2014). Cable’s 
pioneering of satellite communications technology also led to a pronounced growth of services to 
consumers. Satellite delivered channels paved the way for the explosive growth of cable networks 
and companies. Deregulation provided by the 1984 Cable Act also provided a strong positive 
effect and led to the rapid growth of cable services (“Cable Act,” 1984). Cable operators receive 
revenues from two primary sources, local advertising and subscriber fees. Local advertising 
revenues are payments received from businesses for advertising insertions that the cable or 
satellite operator provides. Subscriber revenues are the monthly fees paid by subscribers to
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receive cable service (Clements & Abramowitz, 2006). Cable companies in turn make payments 
to cable networks that provide programming. Some subscriber revenue will then be paid to local 
stations in the form of retransmission fees.   
 Under the current regulatory system, local television stations and local cable systems 
must enter into negotiations with each other for permission to retransmit a broadcast signal over a 
cable system. The vast majority of these retransmission consent negotiations are resolved 
privately, without government intervention and without the loss of broadcast signals to cable 
subscribers. Sometimes negotiations reach an impasse, and the result can be signal blackouts for 
cable subscribers (Burton, 2012). One of the longest television blackouts occurred when Shentel 
Cable fought with Allbrittton’s WJLA-TV, which serves parts of Washington, D.C., and Virginia. 
The dispute left subscribers without the ABC affiliate for 271 days in 2012 (“Longest Blackout 
Ever,” 2012). On September 2, 2013, CBS and Time Warner Cable reached a new broadcasting 
rights agreement ending a month-long blackout of the network’s shows at several key markets in 
the country, including New York, Los Angeles and Dallas (Yu, 2013). The American Television 
Alliance, whose mission is to give consumers a voice to lawmakers, commented on the 
retransmission disputes between CBS and Time Warner saying, “When subscribers of six 
different providers in 58 markets are blacked out of 84 separate stations, how can Congress and 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) fail to acknowledge that the 21-year-old 
retransmission system is broken” (“Statement from the American Television Alliance,” 2013, 
para. 3). 
 Proponents argue the current retransmission consent regulation is an economically 
efficient, market-based approach to compensating broadcasters for the value of their 
programming (Eisenach, 2009). Both broadcasters and cable system operators have a strong 
economic incentive to agree to terms of carriage because local broadcast stations remain the most 
watched channels on cable systems (Clements & Abramowitz, 2006). Supporters say the fact that 
there is an occasional dispute does not mean the retransmission system is broken:
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 Evidence shows that retransmission consent is achieving Congress’ intended 
 purpose of allowing broadcasters to receive and economically efficient level 
 of compensation for the value of their signals, and that this compensation 
 ultimately benefits consumers by enriching the quantity diversity, and  
 quality of available programming, including local broadcast programming 
 (Eisenach & Caves, 2010, p. 2). 
In a marketplace where goods are bought and sold, understanding the dynamics of negotiating 
retransmission consent between cable operators and local television stations is important. The 
findings of this study may help the cable and television industries strengthen its businesses and 
realize new opportunities to better serve their communities. 
The Economics of Retransmission Fees 
For years, cable and satellite distributors have complained about paying too much for 
lower-rated channels that consumers do not want and do not watch (“Support Communities,” 
2014). In many cases, these cable channels are paid far more than broadcast channels, despite 
having only a fraction of the ratings broadcast content generates for the distributors. This practice 
causes price increases in bundled program packages by cable and satellite operators and these 
increases are passed on to consumers. Many times these bundling practices require consumers to 
purchase products in which they have little interest which ultimately drive up programming costs. 
(Crawford & Cullen, 2007). 
Overall, programming costs account for a small portion of cable operators expenses. 
According to a study by Eisenach (2010), of the top five publically traded multi-system operators 
(MSOs), monthly revenues per subscriber (sub) per month rose by $38.06 per month between 
2003 and 2008, while programming expenses rose by only $6.65. Additionally, programming 
expenses for the MSOs increased by approximately 40% from $15.90 per subscriber (sub) per 
month to $22.55 per sub per month, total revenues increased by approximately 55% from $66.86 
per sub per month to $106.92 per sub per month. Despite these healthy revenues, cable and 
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satellite companies are lobbying politicians to revise the retransmission negotiation process. “One 
of cable operators’ arguments against retransmission consent is that any compensation paid to 
broadcasters for their signals is ultimately passed along to consumers in the form of higher retail 
prices” (Eisenach, 2009, p. 23). Regardless of the FCC’s continued support for retransmission 
consent, it is clear that cable operators will continue to seek to fight for changes in the law. 
While cable and satellite providers are upset about the cost of niche cable networks, the 
industry is also frustrated by having to pay retransmission fees to local television stations in its 
service area. Negotiating retransmission fees has become a high priority for local television 
stations due to the complications of the new media landscape. Cable operators would like to 
return to the pre-1992 era, when broadcasters had no right to negotiate for compensation 
(Eisenach, 2009). But eliminating the ability of local broadcasters to negotiate for the value of 
broadcast signals would likely mean less choice for viewers and fewer dollars for stations to 
dedicate to local news, public affairs programming, coverage of emergency weather events and 
community activities (“Protect TV Viewers,” 2013).  Retransmission consent ensures that all 
local stations can negotiate with cable and satellite systems for the popular programming they 
create, produce and transmit.  
Retransmission negotiations can be a complicated and costly process. “A broadcaster 
who chooses broadcast consent over must-carry must negotiate with cable companies for consent 
to retransmit its signal. When negotiations between broadcasters and cable operators break down, 
the lack of consent leads to a possible blackout of the broadcast signal. When this happens 
consumers are inevitably harmed” (Burton, 2012, p. 619). Two cases of blackouts have been 
examined in the literature review including. “The Longest Blackout Ever” and the dispute 
between Time Warner Cable and CBS in 2013. In a statement before the Subcommittee on 
Communications, Technology and the Internet, Jay Rockefeller ,(D-WV), cautioned cable 
operators and broadcasters with this statement regarding retransmission consent: 
If you fail to fix this situation, all three parts of it, we’re going to fix it 
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for you.  But, when we do that, we will seek to do more than referee 
your corporate money disputes, because more than just retransmission 
consent ails our television markets.  We need new catalysts for quality 
news and entertainment programming.  We need slimmed down  
channel packages that better respect what we really want to watch, 
because people are tired of always escalating rates (Longo, 2013). 
While cable systems call for reform of the retransmission consent regulations, broadcasters resist 
government intervention (Burton, 2012). Reforming retransmission consent may be a good 
alternative to the present negotiation process.  
The Drivers of A La Carte Pricing 
Numerous studies by the Federal Communications Commission, National Cable 
Television Association and by independent researchers on the delivery of a la carte programming 
have been conducted since the Cable Act of 1992. A numerical simulation by Rennhoff and 
Serfes (2009) concluded that a la carte regulation (a regulation that would force cable systems to 
unbundle) would be beneficial for consumers. The model developed for the study offered some 
guidance as to whether cable firms should be forced to unbundle, but also stated that, “if cable 
providers respond to a la carte regulations, by raising prices, it is not clear that a la carte pricing 
will be welfare improving” (Rennhoff & Serfes, 2009, p. 549). Some researchers have stated that 
offering networks a la carte would not serve the public interest given the fact that many niche 
channels that benefit from bundling practices would not survive (Heuman, 2011). Traditional 
broadcasters and cable systems are also tasked with protecting their established economic model 
that includes retransmission fees, bundling of cable networks and exclusive delivery of sports and 
entertainment programming. New technologies such as broadband, which has the capacity to 
deliver multiple streams of programming, is the new competitor to cable operators and 
broadcasters and may be the biggest driver to a la carte viewing (Van Tassel, 2001). 
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John McCain ,(R-AZ), has supported giving consumers the ability to buy cable channels 
individually, thus giving them more control over viewing options in their home and, as a result, 
over their monthly cable bill. In a speech on the Senate floor, McCain cited government research 
that found that the average price of expanded basic cable services had increased from $25 per 
month in 1995 to more than $54 today (Sasso, 2013). According to a 2013 report on cable pricing 
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), during the period from 1995 to 2012, the 
price of expanded basic cable service increased at a compound average annual growth rate of 
6.1%, while the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased at a compound average annual growth rate 
of 2.4% (“Report on cable industry prices,” 2013, n.d.). As a result of the concern for increasing 
cable services, McCain introduced the Television Consumer Freedom Act in 2013, with the 
objective to encourage the wholesale and retail “unbundling” of programming by distributors and 
programmers (Smith, 2013). According to Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), a regulation 
mandating a la carte pricing would radically alter the options of the roughly 110 million U.S. 
television households that collectively spend more than $50 billion annually and watch an 
average of more than seven hours of television per day (p. 643).  
Donders and Evens (2001) emphasized that both Internet and telecommunications 
companies are entering the broadcast market, which means more options for consumers. New 
ways to consume video include Internet connected-gaming devices such as Microsoft’s X-Box 
and Sony’s PlayStation.  A number of upcoming over-the-top (OTT) broadband services are on 
the horizon including HBO, CBS All Access and ESPN (OTT services are delivered direct to the 
home via a broadband connection for a fee). Consuming content on mobile devices such as 
smartphones and tablets seem to be favorites of the younger generation (Caumont, 2013). Digital 
technology around the world is disrupting the traditional television industry, which is fighting to 
keep its economic advantage. Traditional cable operators are threatened by the success of OTT 
video platforms such as Netflix, Hulu and Hulu Plus, iTunes and Amazon Video on Demand. 
Although Donders and Evens studied the situation in two foreign countries, the traditional 
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broadcast model in those countries compares favorably to that of the United States. The study 
concluded that old players (i.e., cable operators, television stations and satellite operators) are 
eager to defend their business model by deploying strategies for preserving market power and 
inventing bottlenecks such as scarcity of bandwidth and program exclusivity for new technologies 
to conquer. This study is important because it reflects the concern that a similar practice is taking 
place in the United States in regards to competition from new media. 
In her book Digital TV over Broadband Harvesting Bandwidth, Van Tassel (2001) 
discussed our digital destiny: “Communications and media are being revolutionized by the 
transformation of standalone, stranded information processing machines into connected devices 
and appliances that all talk to one another and exchange data” (p. 505). Here, the author 
emphasized the importance of the information and communications industries in the United States 
by stating, “These industries are a major source of employment, and make up a sizable portion of 
the nation’s exports. Now, we must add to this economic powerhouse the receipts from Internet 
services and access providers, the production of Internet content, and the jobs and companies 
created by the e-conomy [sic]” (Van Tassel, 2001, p. 505). Delivering this information and 
entertainment to consumers is by far the bigger part of the revenue stream, and, as consumers opt 
for broadband access, delivery of video content a la carte over broadband may be the future of 
television. 
To understand the far-reaching implications of digitization, Cover (2005) studied what 
the new forms of television program distribution meant for broadcast scheduling. According to 
Cover, new developments in digital distribution has set the stage for the next generation of 
viewing patterns: “The rise of new, networked, digital and recorded media forms…has worked to 
change the ways in which ‘media time’ (time spent with older media forms as opposed to 
emergent technologies) operates” (Cover, 2005, p. 14). The study showed rigid television 
scheduling is less compatible with viewing patterns of the 2000s and that self-scheduling of 
television programming using digital assets frees consumers to be entertained on a schedule they 
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select without interruption from pre-set work and play timetables. This unparalleled access to an 
ever expanding inventory of new content alternatives at a time when cable growth is declining is 
one of the biggest concerns of the broadcast and cable industries and needs further study to 
evaluate its pace on the viewing habits of consumers. 
In a pure a la carte world, the buyers and sellers of video content could transact more 
directly without the interference from a cable operator or other gatekeeper. Offering channels a la 
carte would give consumers new forms of empowerment for selective viewing. In a study 
regarding a campaign for a la carte delivery of cable channels in the U.S., Heuman (2011) stated, 
“…they (the viewer) reach even further, toward the aura of control and empowerment associated 
with the Web and digital culture” (p. 33). The study characterized the practice of consumers 
paying for what they do not watch and bundling a subsidy or tax on viewers. The research also 
revealed that small or niche cable channels that rely on bundling for their existence would bear 
the heaviest burden in a riskier a la carte environment and that consumers could miss out on 
surfing channels beyond their known preferences and might be paralyzed when it comes to 
selecting a la carte channels. Freedom of choice and control promises consumers new 
empowerment but has the potential to disrupt the current television ecosystem. 
Bundling practices might possibly be one of the biggest drivers of consumer demand for 
a la carte viewing. A study by Crawford (2008) designed to test the discriminatory incentives to 
bundle and quantify their importance in the cable television industry found that adding six of the 
top 15 cable networks to program bundles significantly increased cable demand by consumers.  
Premium program networks such as HBO and niche channels also had an impact on cable 
companies desire to bundle to increase cable demand. The results supported a discriminatory 
explanation for product bundling by cable systems and their resistance to an a la carte pricing 
model. Bundling increases total economic welfare for cable systems but leaves consumers worse 
off, mainly because it acts as a price discrimination mechanism (Crawford, 2008).  
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Hazlet’s economic analysis of cable television pricing (2006) concluded that by 
establishing subscription fees that entitle customers to access a wide assortment of programs on 
the expanded basic tier (or bundle), cable operators could offer greater program variety to the 
consumer. Bundling also allowed distributors and content creators to realize a profit because of 
the shared revenue from the subscriber.  In addition the research suggested that imposing an a la 
carte model would make it harder for viewers to discover programs. Even though the findings 
favored bundling, proponents of an a la carte model made two distinct cases regarding selective 
viewing. First, the economic justification was that it would reduce consumer cable bills. Second, 
a la carte would end the flow of unwanted programming into the subscriber’s homes. The 
overwhelming opinion remains that prices for bundles are unfair when users believe that they are 
paying to support channels they do not value (Hazlet, 2006). Freedom of choice and control 
promises consumers new empowerment and has the potential to disrupt current viewing habits.  
Issues Regarding A La Carte Pricing 
On September, 17, 2014, Jay Rockefeller, (D-WV), and John Thune ,(R-SD), introduced 
Senate Bill 2799 cited as the Satellite Television Access and Viewer Rights Act (STAVRA). The 
bill was designed “to extend the authority of satellite carriers to retransmit certain television 
broadcast station signals, and for other purposes” (Senate Resolution 2799, 2014, p. 1). One of 
the other purposes was to reduce the leverage of broadcast stations in negotiations with cable 
providers by allowing consumers to drop any broadcast channels that they don’t want to pay for. 
In other words, the bill would allow consumers to purchase channels a la carte or what the 
senators referred to as Local Choice. 
The bill passed the Senate but the Local Choice provisions were struck before the vote 
was taken. After the bill passed, Rockefeller and Thune issued a joint statement on Committee 
Passage of the Satellite Television Access and Viewer rights Act (STAVRA). “Local Choice 
proved to be something that was too big and bold to be included in STAVRA due to the limited 
time we have, we are pleased that we were able to start a conversations about the proposal” 
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(Rockefeller & Thune, 2014, p. 1). If the bill had passed in full, the plan would have dramatically 
reshaped the economics of television in that consumers would have been able to pick and pay for 
only the channels they wanted to watch. National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) President 
Gordon Smith commented that the NAB was thankful for the consideration Senate Commerce 
Committee members eliminated the Local Choice proposal citing the numerous negative 
consequences the bill would have on localism, broadcasters and the millions of broadcast 
television viewers (“NAB Statement,” 2014). Defending the amended bill, the American 
Television Alliance stated, “Today’s passage of STAVRA is a clear and convincing victory for 
those fighting to fix our broken retransmission consent system. STAVRA contains several 
significant provisions that will help curb skyrocketing retransmission fees and blackouts, despite 
broadcasters’ wishes” (Senate Commerce Committee, 2014, para. 2). Some industry analysts 
suggest, “If Washington tries to ‘outsmart’ the marketplace…unintended consequences are sure 
to ensue as they always do. Attempted government arbitration of retransmission disputes is likely 
to result in more blackouts, not fewer” (McDowell, 2013, p. 1). 
The Role of the FCC 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent U.S. government 
agency overseen by Congress that regulates interstate and international communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. territories. 
Cable operators, advocacy groups and consumers are pressuring the FCC to reform the laws 
regarding retransmission consent. Some research contends that broadcasters are not spending 
retransmission dollars on news and public affairs programming the way the FCC and Congress 
intended. Consequently, retransmission consent provisions are not accomplishing their original 
goal of enhancing broadcasters commitment to localism (Napoli, 2011). A report by the advocacy 
group TVfreedom stated that retransmission consent costs are a drop in the bucket for cable and 
satellite providers but are an invaluable source of funding for television broadcasters and that the 
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funds are critical to local television stations’ ability to provide local news, community and 
emergency information, as well as top-quality entertainment programming (“TVfreedom,” 2014).   
In a report to Congress in 2005 regarding retransmission consent and exclusivity rules, it 
was noted that cable and satellite service was rapidly penetrating television households and 
increasingly was competing for advertising dollars with free over-the-air television. Congress 
recognized that local television stations rely on advertising to provide free over-the-air local 
service and that competition from cable television posed a threat to the economic viability of 
television broadcast stations. “Therefore it mandated cable carriage to ensure the continued 
economic viability of free local broadcast television” (SHVERA, p. 5). This mandate was 
intended to level the playing field for broadcasters, giving them control over the use of their 
signal and permitting them to seek compensation from cable operators for carriage of their 
signals. Congress emphasized that it intended “to establish a marketplace for the disposition of 
the rights to retransmit broadcast signals” but did not intend “to dictate the outcome of the 
ensuing marketplace negotiations” (SHVERA, 2005, p. 6). It is apparent that several parties, 
including consumers, advocacy groups, cable operators and broadcasters, were affected by the 
retransmission fee negotiation process and have to be considered in the value chain of program 
delivery.  
Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Theory 
 Negotiation is the process whereby people attempt to settle what each shall give and take 
or perform and receive in a transaction between them (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Negotiations are 
an essential part of any business and take place on a daily basis. The implementation of the 
negotiation process is dependent on many factors such as the negotiation skills of the involved 
parties, available information regarding the transaction and the chosen approach and behavior. 
The negotiation outcome depends on the chosen design and the chosen design may lead to 
different outcomes (Stoshikj, 2014). The basic features of negotiation, as recognized by 
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Thompson (1990), include the negotiating parties, their interest, the negotiation process, and the 
negotiation outcome.  
 Negotiation experts distinguish between two types of negotiation: (a) distributive and (b) 
integrative (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). The structure of the bargaining situation is determined by 
the degree of conflict between parties’ interests. Pure conflict exists when parties’ interests are 
perfectly negatively correlated: that is, any outcome that increases one party’s utility decreases 
the other party’s utility in fixed-sum fashion. Pure conflict situations are known as distributive 
negotiations (Watlton & McKerse, 1965). Two people bargaining over the price of a used car for 
which the seller wants more money and the buyer wants to pays as little as possible is an example 
of a distributive negotiations. In the rate dispute CBS versus Time Warner Cable, a distributive 
negotiation occurred. It took over 30 days for the two parties to reach an agreement suggesting a 
great deal of conflict had to be resolved before a solution could be reached. 
 Sometimes parties’ interests are neither completely opposed nor purely compatible. Such 
situations are knows as integrative negotiations (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In these negotiations 
the outcome represents a win-win strategy, which benefits both parties (Kreitner & Kinicki, 
2013). Pruitt (1986) gave the example of a couple in conflict over where to spend a vacation. The 
husband prefers a cabin in the mountains; the wife prefers a luxury hotel on the seashore. An 
integrative agreement is reached when the couple agree to vacation in a luxury hotel in the 
mountains. Many researchers contend that most negotiation situations are integrative (Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965). In the retransmission negotiations 
between cable operators and local broadcast stations, past research reflects that most negotiations 
are resolved without any problems and the negotiation process is working the way Congress 
intended. This would indicate that most retransmission negotiations are integrative and that both 
parties want a solution that benefits both parties. By working together using an integrative 
approach, the parties may enjoy higher benefits in the future as technology and delivery options 
change. According to Pruitt & Rubin (1986), integrative agreements allow negotiators to achieve 
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greater utility, allow negotiators to avoid potential stalemates, and are more stable over time, 
foster harmonious relations between parties, and contribute to the welfare of the broader 
community (Pruitt & Rubin). 
 If we observe the state of negotiations between cable operators and local broadcast 
stations, it is apparent that both distributive and integrative negotiations are taking place. As 
technology and additional viewing options for consumers make their way into the American 
lifestyle, it would be valuable to understand how future negotiations will be conducted, especially 
under an a la carte scenario. A classic analogy used to convey the distributive and integrative 
aspects of negotiation is the sisters and the orange problem (Follett, 1940). Two sisters each want 
a single orange. A common solution is simply to cut the orange in half, which the sisters 
ultimately decide to do, but this outcome is suboptimal because a mutually beneficial, or win-win, 
solution actually exists. By focusing on their demands, the sisters fail to realize their underlying 
interests: one of them only wants the rind to bake a pie, and the other needs to make orange juice. 
A superior solution would fully satisfy the disputing sisters and involved dividing the orange into 
its two parts, such as the one sister receives the entire peel, and the other receives all of the juice. 
Implied in this story is the supposition that the protagonists failed to brainstorm alternatives that 
would have helped them discovery the needs-based solution (or win-win solution) and settled for 
a suboptimal solution instead (Wilson & Thompson, 2014, p. 360). 
 Because negotiation behavior is a fundamental form of social interaction, it is a major 
area of research in several fields. Thompson and Hastie (1990) hypothesized that the accuracy of 
negotiators perceptions of the other party’s interests should play a large role in determining 
outcomes. The reasoning was that negotiators who make inaccurate judgments about the other 
party assume that the other party’s interests are completely opposed to their own, and they, 
therefore, overlook opportunities for mutual gain and settle for suboptimal solutions (Thompson, 
2015). When negotiations take place between cable operators and local television broadcasters 
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over retransmission rights, it is important to study the results of the negotiation as well as the 
negotiation process. 
Summary 
 Several major points emerged from this review of current research on the subject of a la 
carte viewing, retransmission fees and the future of local broadcast television. While cable 
companies and local television stations may sometimes be at odds, the growing importance of 
retransmission fees to these stations is apparent. Considering the potential impact of technology 
and regulation is important in studying the future of a la carte viewing of television programming. 
The idea of a la carte cable pricing is being driven by the shift in consumer viewing behavior and 
could have a profound impact on the television industry. Concerns about where the industry is 
heading include the impact on local broadcaster’s financial health, new over-the-top subscriptions 
services that will deliver content directly to the home and government regulations that are 
designed to protect the traditional television system that is designed to serve the public interest. In 
addition, negotiating retransmission fees is a big concern to cable operators and local station 
managers as stations scramble to find new revenue streams. It is evident that the television 
industry is standing at a tipping point as viewers embrace new offerings that give them the control 
they are seeking. This research project directed questions to local television general managers to 
better understand the impact of offering channels a la carte. The findings may help the television 
industry as it continues to recognize and develop new revenue opportunities in an effort to better 
serve the public interest. 
Research Questions 
As noted in the literature review, the researcher examined (a) the case for retransmission 
consent, (b) the economics of retransmission fees, (c) the drivers of a la carte pricing, and (d) 
issues regarding a la carte pricing. This study was particularly interested in the impact mandated a 
la carte cable pricing would have on local television stations’ retransmission fees. The literature 
has indicated that any a la carte pricing mandate may alter the way cable systems and local 
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broadcast stations negotiate retransmission fees. In a marketplace where goods are bought and 
sold, understanding the dynamics of negotiating retransmission consent between local television 
stations and cable operators is important. The findings may help the television industry strengthen 
its business and realize new opportunities to better serve their communities. Therefore, the 
research questions focused on four key areas. 
The first research question explored how retransmission fees have benefited local 
television stations. Research has shown that retransmission consent was initiated as a way to give 
local broadcast stations control over the use of their signal and to be compensated by cable 
operators (Napoli, 2011).  
RQ1:  How have retransmission fees impacted the financial health of local 
 broadcast television stations? 
The second research question helped identify the necessary information station managers might 
need to negotiate a fair per subscriber fee for their station. Under the regulatory system at the time 
of this research, local stations and local cable systems must enter into negotiations with each 
other for permission to retransmit a broadcast signal over a cable system. 
RQ2:  What factors do broadcast station manager’s use in determining    
  desired television retransmission fees? 
The third research question helped the researcher understand what influence a la carte cable 
pricing would have on a local stations retransmission fees. Competition from companies entering 
the broadcast market offering video services direct to the consumer could disrupt the television 
ecosystem. 
RQ3:  What impact do broadcast station managers believe a la carte cable   
  pricing will have on local television station retransmission fees? 
The fourth research question concerned the financial health of local broadcast stations. Local 
broadcasters negotiate retransmission consent payments from cable operators to receive an 
economically efficient level of compensation for the value of their signals (Eisenach & Caves, 
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2010). A la carte cable pricing could change the way local broadcasters negotiate retransmission 
fees.  
RQ4:  What impact do broadcast managers believe a la carte cable pricing   
  would have on the financial health of local broadcast television?
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this study was to ascertain the impact mandated a la carte pricing would have 
on local television stations and its retransmission fees. The study used survey questions to gather 
information from television station general managers. Survey research involves the collection of 
information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. The survey 
research method was used because it is the best method for collecting large amounts of data from 
many people in different locations, and it has high external validity (Buddenbaum & Novak, 
2001).  
Sample 
The sample consisted of local television general managers in the United States. Names 
and email addresses were collected from the National Association of Broadcasters database. A 
target list of more than 1000 general managers was asked to respond to the survey. It is important 
to note that some general managers who manage stations for large corporations do not conduct 
retransmission negotiations. Many negotiations are managed at the corporate level. For this study, 
the researcher surveyed general managers whether they negotiate or not. The researcher used 
specific guidelines for maximizing response rates including (a) request for participation from 
respondents in advance, (b) the researcher sent another reminder one week prior to the survey, 
and (c) researcher sent reminders during the survey to inform participants about the deadline 
(Dillman, 1991). The researcher anticipated a respondent return of 30%, which is customary for 
this type of survey based on published response rate guidelines (Sheehan, 2006).
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Instrument  
The survey was submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Oklahoma State 
University for review. The IRB waived requiring approval as it determined no personal 
information was being sought in the survey. Each survey included a series of questions using a 
Likert-type scale with answers ranging from (5) strongly agree to (1) strongly disagree. 
To address RQ1 subjects responded to statements such as (a) “Retransmission fees have 
impacted my stations financial health in a positive way;” (b) “Without retransmission fees my 
station would suffer financially;” (c) “Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual 
revenue projections;” and (d) “My station’s news and public service programming would be 
negatively affected without retransmission fees.” 
To address RQ2 the researcher formulated statements based on a qualitative study he 
conducted in 2014 on retransmission fees of local stations in the state of Oklahoma. The 
Oklahoma State University IRB approved the study (“Retransmission Fees and the Future of 
Local Broadcast Television”). The researcher conducted interviews with seven local station 
general managers about retransmission consent negotiations. The answers obtained from the 
general manager interviews determined what factors to ask about in this study. Factors found in 
the initial research included answers to questions regarding stations setting standards for 
retransmission compensation and whether management sets monetary expectations for the value 
of their programming. In addition, general managers suggested station ratings contributed to the 
revenue potential for retransmission compensation as well as comparing one station’s 
performance to another. Thus, for this study, subjects were asked to respond to statements 
including (a) “When negotiating retransmission fees, my station has a standard per subscriber 
dollar amount you are trying to achieve;” (b) “Price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in 
negotiating retransmission fees for my station;” (c) “Station ratings play an important role in 
determining the amount of retransmission compensation for my station;” (d) “Researching how 
other stations in my market are being compensated is important in determining your stations 
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desired per subscriber fee;” (e) “Station consolidation is affecting retransmission negotiations in 
my market;” and (f) “It is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission 
negotiations.” 
To address RQ3, statements included (a) “Offering programming a la carte by cable 
systems will have no effect on my local station’s retransmission compensation;” (b) “Negotiating 
retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte scenario will be significantly different 
for my station;” (c) “My station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating 
retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte mandate;” (d) “Local stations will have 
a greater negotiating position with cable systems under an a la carte scenario;” (e) “Low rated 
stations will have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte mandate;” (f) 
“Variety of programming will effect my retransmission negotiations with cable systems;” and (g) 
“As delivery options change, my station wants a retransmission solution that benefits both 
parties.” 
To address RQ4, statements included (a) “Retransmission fees impact the value of local 
television stations;” (b) “Under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value would be affected in 
a negative way;” (c) “The financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission 
fees;” (d) “A la carte cable pricing would have a positive affect on my stations financial health;” 
(e) “It would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la carte scenario;” and (f) “My 
station is eager to employ a win-win retransmission negotiation strategy with cable operators.” 
Procedure 
The survey was sent to general managers on March 27, 2015 and the survey ended on 
April 15, 2015. The researcher used the online survey tool Survey Monkey. A link to the survey 
was provided in e-mails sent out to respondents. A total of 28 statements were presented. At the 
end of the survey, participants were asked to provide demographic information about their station 
including size of market, location and network affiliation. Participants were also asked to provide 
some personal demographics such as age, gender, station position held and years as a manager. 
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Data Analysis 
 Completed surveys were analyzed using SPSS for MacIntosh. First, the responses to the 
Likert-type scale were coded: Strongly disagree (1), Moderately disagree (2), Agree (3), 
Moderately agree (4), Strongly agree (5).  
 Prior to the analysis, variables were screened for accuracy and the assumptions of a t-test. 
First, the data were screened in SPSS for missing values. If less than 5% was missing, Listwise 
deletion was used (Mertler & Vannata, 2005, pp. 36-37). If 5% to 15% was missing, mean 
substitution was used. The variable was not used if missing data exceeded 15% and it could not 
be determined to have been missing randomly.   
 Next, the data were screened for univariate outliers using frequency distributions, 
descriptive statistics, stem and leaf plots, and boxplots. Frequency distributions were examined 
for the categorical independent variable to determine if any data was out of its normal range. In 
addition, the valid percentages in each category of the independent variable were examined to 
ensure that they did not exceed the standard of less than 90% of the data in one category (Mertler 
& Vannatta, 2005, p. 38). Because the analysis involved grouped data and the assumptions of a t-
test must be satisfied for both groups, that data was split by the dependent variable. Minimum and 
maximum values were reviewed to determine if any data was out of its normal range. The means 
and standard deviations were also examined for each group to determine if they were plausible. 
Stem and leaf plots and boxplots were examined for univariate outliers. When possible, the data 
was checked with the original instrument to ensure its accuracy. Moreover, z-scores were 
generated and values of ±3.0 or more were considered extreme enough to cause problems 
(Garson, 2008). To minimize the effects of the outliers, winsorizing was used (Trabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996, p. 69). 
 The data then were screened for univariate normality using graphs and descriptive 
statistics. Histograms and Q-Q Normal Probability Plots were used to assess the shape of the 
distribution and detect if more than one mode was present. Subsequently, skewness and kurtosis 
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were assessed using the conservative benchmarks of ±1.0 (Garson, 2009) and ±2.0 respectively. 
If the values were greater than these benchmarks, the sample size for each group was also 
checked to determine if the Central Limit Theorem applied. A sample size of at least 30 for each 
group is required for the theorem to apply to a t-test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 71). If the 
theorem applied, the assumption was assumed to be satisfied. If the assumption of normality was 
violated and the Central Limit Theorem did not apply, the variables were transformed. 
 Finally, the variables were screened for homogeneity of variance. Boxplots were 
examined to determine if the height of the box portion of the plots was similar. In addition, 
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance was conducted. If the significance value exceeded .05, the 
assumption was satisfied. If not, the t for Equal Variances Not Assumed was used. 
The data in this study was analyzed using t-tests to determine whether a statistically 
significant difference exists between the means of television stations in markets 1-25 and 26-210. 
This measure is used because 50% of the television households are in the top 25 markets and the 
remaining 50% of the television households are located in markets 26-210 (“Local Television 
Market Estimates,” 2015). The researcher also conducted t-tests comparing markets 1-100 and 
101-210, a normal market comparison used in the television industry. This study used guidelines 
provided by Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero (2002) to determine the strength of the 
association. The t-tests gave the researcher the Measures of Association using Eta and Eta 
Squared. Eta showed the strength of association between the variables and Eta Squared provided 
the researcher the explained variance.  
In addition, data was analyzed using the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
determine whether a statistically significant difference exists between the means of network 
affiliations ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX. A One-Way Analysis of Variance was conducted in cases 
where more than two means were compared. Alpha was set at .05 according to Frankfort-
Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero’s guidelines (2002). 
Validity 
 27 
 Panel validity was sought as the researcher conducted a pretest of the survey with five 
television station general managers who have some knowledge of the subject matter. This 
organized review of the survey’s content is to ensure that the survey contains everything it should 
and does not include anything that it should not (Litwin, 1995). Three of the pretests were 
returned. General managers responding found no problems with the validity of the survey. 
Reliability 
 To test for reliability, the researcher used a five-point Likert-type scale employing 
alternate-form reliability. Alternate-form reliability is when questions or responses are reworded, 
or their order is changed to produce two items that are similar but not identical (Litwin, 1995). 
This procedure forces respondents to read the response alternatives carefully and thus reduces 
practice effect.  
 Researcher presented four research questions regarding retransmission fees and the 
financial health of local television stations throughout the survey. Survey question number one; 
Retransmission fees have impacted my station’s financial health in a positive way. Survey 
question number three; Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue 
projections. Survey question number twenty-two; Retransmission fees impact the value of local 
television stations. Survey question number twenty-four; The financial health of local television 
stations relies on retransmission fees.  The answers to all four questions were compared and 
found to be consistent with the test for alternate-form reliability. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 The goal of this study was to ascertain the impact that mandated a la carte pricing would 
have on local television stations and their retransmission fees. The sample consisted of local 
television general managers in the United States. Data was collected and screened and two t-tests 
were run: (a) comparing answers from markets 1 through 25 with those from markets 26 through 
210 (see Appendix Table 4) and (b) comparing answers from markets 1 through 100 with those 
from markets 101 through 210. (see Appendix Table 5). In addition, a One-Way Anova test was 
conducted comparing answers from stations affiliated with the national networks: ABC, CBS, 
NBC and Fox (see Appendix Table 6).   
Participants 
 A total of 61 of 658 general managers completed the online A La Carte Cable Pricing 
and the Future of Local Broadcasting survey, representing a 9.3% response rate. Of the 46 
respondents who reported their gender, 44 (72%) were male and 2 (3.3%) were female.  Fifteen 
respondents (25%) did not specify a gender. Of the 46 respondents who reported their race or 
ethnicity, 43 (70.5%) were White and 3 (5%) were Hispanic or Latino. Fifteen (25%) did not 
identify a race or ethnicity.  
 Thirty-six respondents (57.4%) had a Bachelor’s Degree, 7 (11.5%) had a Master Degree 
and 1 (2%) held a Doctorate Degree. Two (3.1%) did not have a college degree. More than a third 
of the general managers responding, 22, have been in the television business for more than 10  
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years (36.1%). Sixteen respondents (26.2%) have been in their current position as general 
manager for 1 to 5 years and 8 respondents (13.1%) have held their current position 5 to 10 years. 
Fifteen respondents (25%) did not report their years of service. 
  One of the most interesting statistics was that of the 45 general managers that responded 
to the question, “Have you ever negotiated retransmission fees for a television station?” 37 (61%) 
answered yes. This indicates that a large portion of the survey respondents have some knowledge 
of the retransmission negotiation process. Only 8 (13%) said no and 16 (26.2%) did not answer 
the question. In addition, 24 (39.3%) currently do not negotiate retransmission consent for their 
station, while 21 (34.4%) currently do negotiate retransmission consent for their stations. Sixteen 
(26.2%) did not respond to the question. 
 A total of 46 (75%) general managers reported their market size. Market size was defined 
using Nielsen Local Television Market Station Universe (“Local Television Market Estimates,” 
2014). Twenty-eight of the stations (46%) were in the top 100 markets and 18 of the respondents’ 
stations (29.5%) were in the markets 101-210 category. Taking a closer look at the breakdown of 
the reporting stations, 9 stations were in markets 51 to 75, and 9 were in markets 76 to 100 – each 
representing 15% of the survey sample. Five stations (8.2%) were in markets 1 to 25, and 5 
stations (8.2%) were in markets 26 to 50. Fifteen (25%) of the respondents did not state their 
market size. 
 Forty-six (75.4%) of the 61 respondents indicated network affiliations as follows: ABC 
15 (25%), NBC 11 (18%), CBS 9 (15%), Fox 9 (15%), and other 2 (3%). Fifteen (25%) did not 
state a network affiliation. 
Results 
 Research Question 1, asking how retransmission fees have impacted the financial health 
of local broadcast television stations, consisted of four sub-questions. When assessing whether 
retransmission fees have impacted a station’s financial health in a positive way (Q1), 43 (70%) 
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respondents strongly agreed, 10 (16.4%) agreed, 6 (9.8%) moderately agreed, 1 (1.6%) strongly 
disagreed and 1 (1.6%) moderately disagreed. (See Table 1). When asked if their station would 
suffer financially without retransmission fees (Q2), 30 (49.2%) strongly agreed, 22 (36.1%) 
agreed, 5 (8.2%) moderately agreed, 3 (4.9%) strongly disagreed and 1 (1.6%) moderately 
disagreed. When asked if retransmission fees were important to their station’s annual revenue 
projections (Q3), 39 (64%) strongly agreed, 13 (21.3%) agreed, 6 (9.8%) moderately agreed, 2 
(3.3%) strongly disagreed and 1 (1.6%) moderately disagreed. When asked if their station’s news 
and public service programming would be negatively affected without retransmission fees (Q4), 
25 (41%) strongly agreed, 20 (33%) agreed, 7 (11%) moderately agreed, 5 (8%) moderately 
disagreed, 3 (5%) strongly disagreed and 1 (2%) did not answer the question. 
 Research Question 2 asked what factors do broadcast station managers use in determining 
desired television retransmission fees, and consisted of 7 sub-questions. When asked if their 
station had a standard per-subscriber dollar amount they were trying to achieve (Q6), 20 (33%) 
agreed, 13 (21%) strongly agreed, 11 (18%) moderately agreed, 3 (5%) moderately disagreed and 
14 (23%) did not answer. When asked their stations’ target price per subscriber range (Q7), 21 
(34%) of respondents selected the $1 to $1.50 per subscriber range, 20 (33%) specifically 
declined to answer, 4 (7%) selected other, 3 (5%) selected $0.75 cents to $1, 3 (5%) selected 
more than $2 per subscriber, 1 (2%) selected less than $0.50 cents per subscriber and 9 (15%) did 
not respond to the question. When asked whether price per subscriber was the primary difficulty 
in negotiating retransmission fees for their station (Q8), 20 (33%) agreed, 14 (23%) moderately 
agreed, 14 (23%) strongly agreed, 4 (7%) moderately disagreed, and 9 (15%) did not answer. 
When asked if station ratings played an important part in determining the amount of 
retransmission compensation (Q9), 18 (30%) moderately disagreed, 11 (18%) agreed, 10 (16%) 
moderately agreed, 7 (11%) strongly disagreed, 4 (7%) strongly agreed and 11 (18%) did not  
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Table 1       Survey Question Percentages  
Survey 
Questions 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately  
Disagree 
Agree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 
Q1: 1 (1.6%) 1 (1.6%) 10 (16.4%) 6 (9.8%) 43 (70.5%) 
*Q2: 3 (5%) 1 (1.6%) 22 (36.1%) 5 (8.2%) 30 (70.5%) 
Q3: 2 (3.3%) 1 (1.6%) 13 (21.3%) 6 (9.8%) 39 (64%) 
Q4: 3 (5%) 5 (8%) 20 (33%) 7 (11%) 25 (41%) 
Q6: 0 (0%) 3 (5%) 20 (33%) 11 (18%) 13 (21%) 
Q7: Less than .50 
1 (2%) 
.75 to $1 
3 (5%) 
$1 to $1.50 
21 (34%) 
More than $2 
3 (5%) 
Other 
4 (7%) 
Q8: 0 (0%) 4 (7%) 20 (33%) 14 (23%) 14 (23%) 
Q9: 7 (11%) 18 (30%) 11 (18%) 10 (16%) 4 (7%) 
Q10: 3 (5%) 9 (15%) 21 (34%) 9 (15%) 9 (15%) 
Q11: 7 (11%) 14 (23%) 16 (26%) 7 (11%) 5 (8%) 
*Q12: 1 (2%) 11 (18%) 19 (31%) 15 (25%) 5 (8%) 
Q14: 5 (8%) 12 (20%) 21 (34%) 9 (15%) 3 (5%) 
Q15: 3 (5%) 15 (25%) 12 (20%) 15 (25%) 5 (8%) 
Q16: 2 (3%) 11 (18%) 15 (25%) 11 (18%) 12 (20%) 
Q17: 1 (2%) 14 (23%) 20 (33%) 4 (7%) 11 (18%) 
Q18: 0 (0%) 15 (25%) 15 (25%) 15 (25%) 5 (8%) 
Q19: 2 (3%) 6 (10%) 25 (41%) 14 (23%) 2 (3%) 
Q20: 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 26 (43%) 11 (18%) 11 (18%) 
Q22: 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 15 (25%) 6 (10%) 25 (41%) 
Q23: 4 (7%) 23 (38%) 6 (10%) 11 (18%) 1 (2%) 
Q24: 3 (5%) 5 (8%) 8 (13%) 13 (21%) 17 (28%) 
Q25: 1 (2%) 20 (33%) 13 (21%) 8 (13%) 3 (5%) 
Q26: 1 (2%) 22 (36%) 12 (20%) 7 (11%) 3 (5%) 
Q27: 0 (0%) 3 (5%) 23 (38%) 9 (15%) 10 (16%) 
 32 
 answer. When asked if their station researched the market to determine a fair per subscriber price 
(Q10), 21 (34%) agreed, 9 (15%) moderately disagreed, 9 (15%) moderately agreed, 9 (15%) 
strongly agreed, 3 (5%) strongly disagreed and 10 (16%) did not answer. When asked if station 
consolidation was affecting retransmission negotiations in their market (Q11), 16 (26%) agreed, 
14 (23%) moderately disagreed, 7 (11%) moderately agreed, 7 (11%) strongly disagreed, 5 (8%) 
strongly agreed and 12 (20%) did not answer. The survey also suggested stations were somewhat 
eager to avoid conflict during retransmission negotiations (Q12), with 19 (31%) agreeing, 15 
(25%) moderately agreeing, 11 (18%) moderately disagreeing, 5 (8%) strongly agreeing, 1 (2%) 
strongly disagreeing and 10 (16%) did not answer. 
 Research Question 3 asked what impact broadcast station managers believe a la carte 
cable pricing will have on local television retransmission fees. When asked if cable systems 
offering programming a la carte would have no effect on their station’s retransmission 
compensation (Q14), 21 (34%) agreed, 12 (20%) moderately disagreed, 9 (15%) moderately 
agreed, 5 (8%) strongly disagreed, 3 (5%) strongly agreed and 11 (18%) did not answer. When 
asked if negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte scenario would be significantly 
different for their station (Q15), 15 (25%) moderately disagreed, 15 (25%) moderately agreed, 12 
(20%) agreed, 5 (8%) strongly agreed, 3 (5%) strongly disagreed and 11 (18%) did not answer. 
When respondents were asked about station’s ratings being extremely important in negotiating 
retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte mandate (Q16), 15 (25%) agreed, 12 
(20%) strongly agreed, 11 (18%) moderately disagreed, 11 (18%) moderately agreed, 2 (3%) 
strongly disagreed and 10 (16%) did not answer. When asked whether local stations would have a 
greater negotiating position with cable systems under an a la carte scenario (Q17), 20 (33%) 
agreed, 14 (23%) moderately disagreed, 11 (22%) strongly agreed, 4 (7%) moderately agreed, 1 
(2%) strongly disagreed and 11 (18%) did not answer. When general managers were asked 
whether low-rated stations would have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an a la 
carte mandate (Q18), 15 (25%) moderately disagreed, 15 (25%) agreed, 15 (25%) moderately 
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agreed, 5 (8%) strongly agreed and 11 (18%) did not answer. When asked if variety of 
programming would affect retransmission negotiations with cable systems (Q19), 25 (41%) 
agreed, 14 (23%) moderately agreed, 6 (10%) moderately disagreed, 2 (3%) strongly agreed, 2 
(3%) strongly disagreed and 12 (20%) did not answer. When asked if stations sought a 
retransmission solution benefitting both parties in the changing technological environment (Q20), 
26 (43%) agreed, 11 (18%) moderately agreed, 11 (18%) strongly agreed, 1 (2%) moderately 
disagreed and 12 (20) did not answer.  
 Research Question 4 asked what impact broadcast managers believe a la carte cable 
pricing would have on the financial health of local broadcast television. When general managers 
were asked if retransmission fees impact the value of local television station (Q22), 25 (41%) 
strongly agree, 15 (25%) agree, 6 (10%) moderately agree and 15 (25%) did not answer. When 
asked under an a la carte scenario would a local station’s value would be affected in a negative 
way (Q23), 23 (38%) moderately disagreed, 11 (18%) moderately agreed, 6 (10%) agreed, 4 (7%) 
strongly disagreed, 1 (2%) strongly agreed and 16 (26%) did not answer. When asked if the 
financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission fees (Q24), 17 (28%) strongly 
agreed, 13 (21%) moderately agreed, 8 (13%) agreed, 5 (8%) moderately disagree, 3 (5%) 
strongly disagree and 15 (25%) did not answer.  When asked if a la carte cable pricing would 
have a positive affect on their station’s financial health (Q25), 20 (33%) moderately disagreed, 13 
(21%) agreed, 8 (13%) moderately agreed, 3 (5%) strongly agreed, 1 (2%) strongly disagreed and 
16 (26%) did not answer. When asked if it would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under 
an a la carte scenario (Q26), 22 (36%) moderately disagreed, 12 (20%) agreed, 7 (11%) 
moderately agreed, 3 (5%) strongly agreed, 1 (2%) strongly disagreed and 16 (26%) did not 
answer. When asked if their station was eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy with 
cable operators (Q27), 23 (38%) agreed, 10 (16%) strongly agreed, 9 (15%) moderately agreed, 3 
(5%) moderately agreed and 16 (26%) did not answer. 
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Impact of Market Size 
 To discover if market size had any influence on the answers, the researcher ran t-tests on 
markets 1-25 compared to markets 26-210 and markets 1-100 compared to 101-210. Comparison 
of markets 1-25 and markets 26-210 represents half of the television homes in the United States. 
The comparison of markets 1-100 and markets 101- 210 represents a common comparison in the 
television industry, (See Tables A and B in Appendix). 
 The researcher identified only two questions that had results that were statistically 
significant, or unlikely to have happened by chance alone. Identifying only two questions that 
showed significance was likely due to only five responses from markets 1-25.  Question number 
two stated, “Without retransmission fees, my station would suffer financially.” 
Table 2  
T-test Comparing market size by without retransmission fees, my station would suffer 
financially. 
 n M SD t η   η 2 
M. 1-25 5 3.0000 .00000 -2.186* .313 .098 
M. 26-201 41 4.2195 1.23516    
* p < .05           M. indicates market size 
 An independent t-test was conducted because the means of two unrelated groups were 
compared. As Table 1 shows, t(44) = -2.19, p = .03, markets 1-25, M = 3.0, were less impacted 
by retransmission fees than markets 26-210, M = 4.22. An analysis of association using eta,  
η = .31, indicated a weak relationship between markets 1-25 and markets 26-201, according to 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero’s guidelines (2002, p. 253). Eta-squared was used to 
determine the explained variance, η 2 = .098. Market size explained 9.8% of the variation in 
stations suffering financially without retransmission fees.
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 Question number 12 stated, “It is important that my station avoids conflict during 
retransmission negotiations.” 
Table 3 
T-test Table Comparing market size by stations avoiding conflict during retransmission 
negotiations. 
 n M SD t η   η 2 
M. 1-25 5 2.400 1.1402 -2.239* .320 .102 
M. 26-201 41 3.396 .91683    
* p < .05           M. indicates market size 
 An independent t-test was conducted because the means of two unrelated groups were 
compared. As Table 2 shows, t(44) = -2.24, p = .03, markets 1-25, M = 2.4, were less concerned 
about avoiding conflict during retransmission negotiation than markets 26-210,  
M = 3.4. An analysis of association using eta, η = .32, indicated a weak relationship between 
markets 1-25 and markets 26-210, according to Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero’s 
guidelines (2002, p. 253). Eta-squared was used to determine the explained variance, η 2 = -.10. 
Market size explained 10% of the variation in the importance of stations voiding conflict during 
retransmission negotiations.  
 Other questions that came close to significance when comparing markets 1-100 and 101-
210 included (Q11), asking is station consolidation affecting retransmission negotiations in their 
market (p = .09) and (Q26), asking if it would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an 
a la carte scenario (p = .09).   
 In addition, the researcher conducted one-way ANOVA tests on affiliates of ABC, NBC, 
CBS and Fox in order to determine whether any of the answers were influenced by network 
affiliation. No answers were significant, although (Q14) asking cable systems offering 
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programming a la carte will have no effect on my station’s retransmission compensation (p = .07) 
came close to significance.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact retransmission fees have on the 
financial health of local television stations, how a la carte delivery of programming could impact 
that industry, and how a la carte programming could change the economics of the television 
business, including the way local broadcast stations negotiate for distribution with cable systems. 
The researcher found that (a) retransmission fees are an important part of the financial health of 
local television stations, (b) that negotiations are an important part of the retransmission consent 
process, and (c) that negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte mandate could influence 
the financial health of local broadcast stations. 
 The most important findings of this research centered on retransmission fees and the 
financial health of local broadcast stations. Research question one asked, “How have 
retransmission fees impacted the financial health of local broadcast television stations?” More 
than 70% of general managers agreed to some extent that retransmission fees impacted their 
station’s financial health in a positive way. When general managers were asked if their station 
would suffer financially without retransmission fees, a t-test showed a significant difference,  
(p = .03) between markets 26-210, (M = 4.22) and television markets 1-25, (M = 3.0). This 
indicates that smaller stations (markets 26-210) are more reliant on retransmission fees for their 
financial health than larger stations (markets 1-25). This could be due in part that advertising
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dollars contribute a greater percentage of annual revenue dollars in markets 1-25 than 
retransmission fees. In addition, many of the top 25 market stations are owned by one of the 
major networks (ABC, NBC, CBS or Fox) and account for retransmission fees at the corporate 
level. General manager comments from stations in markets 26-210 suggested for greater 
importance: “It is the difference between profitability and not” and “Retransmission fees 
constitute over 40% of our station’s revenues and have even exceeded our advertising revenue in 
a few months.” Larger market (1-25) general managers suggested “They are a positive force now, 
but the network takes well over half of the money paid to the station” and “Provides nearly 20% 
of total revenue but will be compromised by my network in the future.” This means that many 
stations have to re-compensate their network for the programming they provide.  
 The study offered three additional survey questions about a station’s financial health that 
can be viewed as a sign for the critical nature of retransmission fees in all television markets. The 
question, “Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue projections” had a 
mean score in markets 1-25 and 26-210 of 4.4. This mean score suggest retransmission fees are 
an important part of a station’s annual income. The question, “Retransmission fees impact the 
value of local television stations” had a mean score in markets 1-25 and 26-210 of 4.2 also 
suggesting a positive response to retransmission fees when it comes to station valuation, or what a 
station is worth. The third question regarding the financial health of local broadcast stations asked 
“The financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission fees” had a mean score 
in markets 26-210 of 3.9 and in markets 1-25 the mean score was 3.0. These results suggest that 
retransmission fees in markets 26-210 are an important part of a local television station’s bottom 
line and helps strengthen their ability to provide important local programming to viewers. In 
markets 1-25 the results indicate that retransmission fees are not as important to their financial 
health as markets 26-210. Network compensation was discontinued in the early 2000s and 
retransmission fees have helped replace network compensation dollars and have allowed local 
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stations to be compensated for their programming which improves their financial health.  
 The majority of general managers surveyed in markets 1-25 and in markets 26-210 agree 
that retransmission fees impact a station’s financial health in a positive way. Respondents’ 
comments in markets 1-25 included, “Retransmission fees have offset much of the national 
advertising declines.” Comments from markets 26-210 included “These fees are necessary for 
keeping local broadcasters financially viable and preserving localism”; “To compete with the dual 
revenue stream that cable networks receive, broadcast TV must get paid for its content.” Overall, 
retransmission consent represents an economically efficient way for a broadcaster to be 
compensated by cable operators for the value of their programming (Eisenach & Caves, 2010). 
 The primary objective of federal television regulation is to protect local origination of 
programming such as local news and public affairs (Cable Act, 1992). Local television stations’ 
general managers in markets 26-210 responded to what the federal government stated as its 
primary objective with comments such as, “Retransmission fees allow us to produce local 
programming we would not otherwise be able to afford” and “Without retransmission fees 
smaller stations would find it difficult to maintain their current programming commitments.” 
Other general managers stated, “The additional revenue stream has helped us offset the continued 
equipment upgrades necessary to stay compliant with the FCC” and “The loss of retransmission 
revenue would result in staff and news cuts in order to show a profit for our investors.” In 
examining these responses, these general managers are showing the importance of retransmission 
fees to a local station’s financial health. Retransmission fees benefit both large and small stations, 
giving them an additional revenue stream that helps stations pay for their operating expenses and 
programming commitments. Most general managers agree retransmission fees have provided 
stations with “very healthy financial impact.” 
 The second part of the survey asked questions regarding negotiating retransmission 
consent. Research question two asked, “What factors do broadcast station manager’s use in 
determining desired television retransmission fees?” It is clear that local stations devise strategies 
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to obtain the highest value for their programming, including researching the market, comparing 
their per-subscriber pricing to other stations, and developing a target price per subscriber. In 
answering questions regarding negotiation of retransmission fees, many general managers agreed 
that their station had a standard per subscriber dollar amount they were trying to achieve. Markets 
26-210 had a mean score of 3.9 and markets 1-25 had a mean score of 3.8 indicating a positive 
response. Seventy-nine percent of general managers also agreed, moderately agreed or strongly 
agreed price per subscriber was the primary difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees for their 
station. This indicates market research by general managers is necessary to obtain the maximum 
value for their programming. When general managers were asked about a station’s target price 
per subscriber, the study showed that stations are negotiating an average price between $1 and 
$1.50 per subscriber. Some general managers in markets 26-210 suggested, “The per subscriber 
fees, paid to broadcast and cable networks, is way out of balance, especially when ratings are 
considered,” and “Our audience is ten times ESPN’s, but we only receive a fraction of their fees.” 
Another general manager commented, “Retransmission negotiations greatly favor the larger 
station groups and will accelerate the disappearance of small or privately owned stations groups.” 
Overall, these general manager comments represent their attitude that there is a significant 
inequity in the amount of retransmission compensation they receive compared to the ratings their 
stations deliver for a cable system. Future negotiations may be based on audience delivery as well 
as diversity of programming. 
  It is interesting to note that when commenting on negotiating retransmission fees, most 
general managers took an Integrative Negotiation approach, meaning they were looking for a 
harmonious relationship with their cable system (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). On the question that 
stated, “It is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission negotiations,” there 
was a significance difference (p = .03) in answers according to market size. An independent  
 t-test was conducted comparing markets 1-25 to markets 26-210. The t-test showed that general
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managers in markets 26-210 (M = 3.4) were more concerned about avoiding conflict during 
retransmission negotiations than markets 1-25, (M = 2.4). The significant difference in avoiding 
conflict in large and small markets could be due, as suggested earlier, to retransmission revenue 
in larger markets representing a smaller percentage of annual revenue when compared to overall 
revenue and larger markets having greater leverage because the major networks own most of the 
affiliates in the top 25 markets. 
 A successful retransmission negotiation was the goal of the federal government when it 
refined the rules of retransmission consent. Many general managers agree that they want a 
mutually beneficial outcome when negotiating retransmission consent. When general managers 
were asked, “As delivery options change my station wants a retransmission solution that benefits 
both parities,” 67% of general managers agreed, moderately agreed or strongly agreed that they 
wanted a solution that benefited both cable operators and local television stations. When general 
mangers were asked if their station “Was eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy with 
cable operators,” general managers overwhelming agreed with 69% agreeing, moderately 
agreeing or strongly agreeing, indicating a win-win negotiation was important. Comments from 
general managers in markets 1-25 included, “Local TV stations are among the highest viewed 
stations on any cable system, stronger negotiating position.” In markets 26-210 general managers 
comments included, “Looking for a mutual understanding of each other’s situation” and another 
respondent commented about the importance of “building a strong local relationship with cable 
operators.” 
 Most general manager comments stressed the importance of working together to find a 
common ground for negotiations. Television stations working together with cable systems to find 
a profitable solution to a la carte pricing, using an integrative approach to negotiations, could be   
the key to future negotiations. An integrative negotiation can create a marketplace of values 
through discussion and find common ground for negotiation that will help build relationships for 
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future negotiations (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). This win-win relationship could help create new 
revenue opportunities and fight challenges from new programming competitors. 
  Donders and Evens (2001) emphasized that both Internet and telecommunications 
companies are entering the broadcast market, which means more options for consumers. As noted 
in the literature review, several factors are driving a la carte pricing, including high cable rates 
and unfair bundling practices, along with new competition such as over-the-top (OTT) broadband 
program services and the Internet. Most general managers agree that a strong station or a station 
with high ratings would have an advantage in negotiating retransmission fees. Research question 
three asked, “What impact broadcast station managers believe a la carte pricing will have on local 
television retransmission fees?” In responding to the question, “Cable systems offering 
programming a la carte will have no effect on my station’s retransmission compensation,” a high 
percentage of general managers (54%) agreed, moderately agreed or strongly agreed. It is 
interesting to note that two questions addressing negotiations under an a la carte pricing, 
“Negotiating retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte scenario will be 
significantly different for my station,” had a mean score in all markets of 3.2 while the question, 
“My station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating retransmission fees with cable 
systems under an a la carte mandate,” had a mean score in all markets of 3.4, indicating a 
station’s ratings will have an impact on negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte 
mandate. When asked how a la carte cable pricing would influence their station’s retransmission 
negotiations, respondents in markets 1-25 commented, “If our programming is strong (local 
augmented by network, must see), it is supply and demand.” Additional general manager 
comments included, “Local TV stations are among the highest viewed stations on any cable 
system, stronger negotiating position.” General managers in markets 26-210 suggested, “Strong 
local news will be a benefit for stations negotiating new agreements with cable companies.” The 
majority (58%) either agreed, moderately agreed or strongly agreed that “Low rated stations will 
have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte mandate” while 75% agreed 
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on some level that “Variety of programming will affect my retransmission negotiation with cable 
systems.” This indicates that low rated stations may have a hard time getting retransmission fees 
from cable operators and that variety of programming will help in retransmission negotiations. 
The survey also suggests that the majority of general managers are going to rely on strong local 
programming to compete in an a la carte world and with new competition from non-traditional 
video platforms.  
 Some of the concerns regarding negotiations from general managers in markets 26-210 
included, “A la carte could reduce our subscribers, thus reducing our income”; “The public will 
pick their station of choice”; “At this time the impact of ‘a la carte’ pricing is total speculation.” 
These comments indicate there are real concerns if cable systems offer programming a la carte. 
Strong stations with a variety of programming may be the key to survival in the a la carte era. To 
compete in the new competitive programming marketplace, television stations and cable 
operators need to develop a new a la carte strategy. Developing an integrative approach to 
retransmission negotiations could result in new partnerships between cable operators and local 
broadcasters resulting in additional revenue opportunities in the future.  
 Research question four asked “What impact do broadcast managers believe a la carte 
cable pricing would have on the financial health of local broadcast television?” Overall, general 
managers were uncertain on what impact a la carte pricing would have on a station’s financial 
health. When general managers were asked, “Under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value 
would be affected in a negative way,” 55% of general managers agreed and 45% disagreed. This 
could indicate that general managers overall are uncertain about the impact a la carte cable 
pricing would have on a station’s value. When asked if a la carte cable pricing would have a 
positive effect on their station’s financial health, a third of the respondents (33%) moderately 
disagreed. Answers to these questions indicate that some stations would see no effect on their 
station’s value while other may be harmed by an a la carte mandate. When general managers 
were asked, “Whether it would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la carte 
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scenario,” 36% moderately disagreed, indicating it would make negotiations harder. Low-rated 
stations and stations that lack program variety may struggle with retransmission negotiations as 
consumers find alternative program suppliers as noted in the comments from general managers 
below. Most of the general managers (76%) agreed, moderately agreed or strongly agreed on the 
statement, Retransmission fees impact the value of local television stations. Regarding 
negotiations under an a la carte scenario, general managers believe strong stations with a large 
local news presence will have an advantage under an a la carte mandate. Some general managers 
in markets 26-210 expressed concern that, “Some subscribers might choose to not buy our signal. 
That would lower our retransmission consent revenues.” Another general manager said, “Cable 
operators focus on trying to take local advertising dollars from television stations. A la carte 
pricing will likely have a negative impact on cable’s attempt to grab local advertisers away from 
broadcast TV.”  
 Congress adopted its retransmission consent provisions to allow broadcasters to negotiate 
for compensation for the value of their signals. Broadcasters provide valuable content to cable 
television providers and use retransmission consent fees to deliver high-quality news and local 
content to viewers. In the majority of retransmission consent negotiations, an agreement is 
reached peaceably. In these negotiations, the current rules are working as intended. Under an a la 
carte scenario the rules will change. Now is the time for local broadcasters and cable operators to 
develop a plan for the future delivery of programming a la carte. Working together, they can 
develop new delivery options and revenue opportunities that exceed consumer expectations.  
Implications 
 Local television stations have dominated the television business for more than 50 years.  
And while some station profits are down, the vast majority of stations are still making money 
(Schechner & Dana, 2011). Local stations have faced challenges from cable and satellite 
delivered programming to new broadband competitors, including online movie companies and 
direct to the consumer programming services delivered over the Internet. With all the new 
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competition local stations continue to be resilient, tapping into and embracing new technologies. 
Local stations are developing new revenue streams with their second channel allocations and 
online and mobile services such as news and weather apps. And because local stations are granted 
a license to the airwaves that broadcast local television signals, major networks such as ABC, 
NBC, CBS and Fox could not distribute content to a broad audience without them. The network 
affiliation system gives local stations access to original content, such as major sporting events, 
awards shows and time sensitive original programming which create advertising sales 
opportunities for local stations. These opportunities strengthen local sales so stations can deliver 
on their promise of quality news, public service and emergency programming. To protect local 
stations lobbying may occur asking the government to protect local broadcasters from networks 
distributing content directly to consumers. The government could serve local broadcasters by 
passing rules that prevent major networks from going around local affiliates to deliver their 
programming using OTT services. This type of policy would assure local broadcasters have a 
continuous stream of premium content to monetize.    
 This study also focused on a la carte cable pricing and the future of local television 
stations, which is just one of the many challenges facing local broadcasters. To better understand 
the changing dynamics of the relationship between cable systems and local broadcast television 
stations, it is important to look back at their history. After the ascension of cable television on the 
media landscape, the Federal Communications Commission adopted laws to protect local 
broadcasters from unfair practices by cable operators. The purpose of these laws was to ensure 
the economic viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local 
programming including news, public affairs and emergency services. Many of these laws have 
resulted in an adversarial relationship between cable operators and local broadcasters. 
Retransmission compensation is one of the most contentious issues between cable operators and 
broadcasters, with cable operators arguing that the retransmission consent regulations are 
outdated and harming consumers. One way consumers are harmed is when negotiations break 
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down, resulting in signal blackouts. The retransmission consent issue has “morphed over the 
years into a fight between well-financed special interests to see who could best game the rules to 
their own advantage” (Burton, 2012, p. 623). The good news for local broadcast television is that 
retransmission fees add an additional revenue stream to help supplement costs of new equipment 
and programming commitments. The bad news is that national broadcast networks are 
increasingly taking an active role in their affiliates’ retransmission consent negotiations in an 
effort to obtain “reverse compensation” from their local affiliates. However, retransmission 
consent for the first time gives television broadcasters a substantial property right in their local 
programming. This property right allows stations to produce more (and more diverse) local news 
and informational programming (Napoli, 2011). Broadcasters themselves have recently 
emphasized the linkage between local public service programming and retransmission fees as 
noted in the discussion section of this study. It is imperative that local broadcasters, as a public 
trustee, continue to invest in news and public affairs programming. Such programming long has 
been central to the FCC’s localism goals (Napoli, 2011). 
 Cable systems delivering programming a la carte is another challenge facing local 
broadcasters and is one of the most toxic suggestions from consumers for controlling runaway 
cable subscriber fees. Consumers are driving this initiative due to the influence of the Internet and 
new services that avoid the gatekeepers and deliver programming directly to the consumer. 
Services such as Netflix and HBO Go are disrupting the entire ecosystem. Research finds that 
17% of broadband households are likely to subscribe to an over-the-top (OTT) video service from 
HBO and that roughly one-half would cancel their pay-tv service after subscribing to the HBO 
OTT service (Parks Associates, 2015). Consumers have realized several alternatives to the static 
distribution model offered by local broadcasters and cable operators and no longer subscribe to a 
set time for viewing popular programs. This opportunity is driving a la carte conversations as an 
alternative to traditional media delivery. The market for television programming is highly 
competitive. A la carte delivery by cable operators may change the way retransmission consent is 
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negotiated, opening new options for content delivery. Both broadcasters and cable operators have 
a degree of market power and by working together using their market power, both industries 
could increase viewing time and advertising dollars in local television advertising markets. One 
way local stations and cable systems could use their market power is to offer additional channels 
that viewers could pay for. Local television stations are producers of content. Local cable 
operators are distributors of content. Creating new channels such as local weather reports, movie 
channels or even a channel that sells cars around the clock could create new advertising 
opportunities or subscription fees that could be shared by these new media ventures. Moving 
beyond normal business practices, making partners out of competitors, embracing opportunities, 
sharing marketing responsibilities and working collaboratively could build a platform for a 
successful future.  
 Emerging technology, new forms of program distribution and contentious cable 
negotiations are not the only challenges facing broadcasters. Policy changes are also a concern for 
local television stations. Congress and the FCC have a long-standing reputation for protecting the 
industry from financial harm. The reasons are clear: local broadcasters operate in the public 
interest and provide important news and emergency programming that help protect local citizens. 
In the 2000s the television industry faces different types challenges due to technology and 
competitive issues, most importantly broadband and wireless distribution of programming or 
streaming. The question remains how will the government deal with these challenges to once 
again protect the financial interest of local broadcasters so they can continue to provide and pay 
for important local programming services. Past government action that has benefitted 
broadcasters include relaxed rules that led to station consolidation not to exceed more than 39% 
of all U.S. television households, local television multiple ownership rule that allows an entity to 
own up to two television stations in the same market, new incentive auctions of broadcast 
airwaves set to take place in 2016 that will allow broadcasters to sell some of their spectrum 
(FCC.gov, 2015). The government is seeking to pay stations billions of dollars to move off those 
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airwaves, and then it plans to sell those airwaves to wireless carriers. These actions have helped 
broadcast property owners pool resources resulting in reduced costs and more efficient 
operations. In the future it will be important to see how the government protects local broadcast 
stations as local television’s mass audience appeal splinters into niches as viewers flock to 
alternative entertainment choices. With the uncertainty of the future, local broadcasters must 
work to develop new partnerships, create additional categories of advertisers and learn how to 
survive on less. One possible new partnership could be with local newspapers. Although the FCC 
revised the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule in its 2006 quadrennial review order, the 
court’s 2011 decision vacated and remanded that modified rule. As a result, the FCC’s rules 
continue to prohibit common ownership of daily newspaper and a full-power broadcast station 
(AM, FM, or TV) if the station’s service contour encompasses the newspaper’s city of publication 
(FCC.gov, 2015). A decision by the FCC to relax its existing ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership could create an exciting partnership. A local television station joining with daily 
newspaper, co-producing news stories and creating advertising opportunities could be another 
way to benefit the industry. The new partnership would encourage media properties to pool 
resources, share costs in an effort to increase revenues.   
 Looking ahead, more and more local broadcasters are moving beyond their basic 
broadcast roots and embracing new technologies that allow viewers to connect with content in 
non-conventional ways such as on mobile devices and through the Internet. Putting content 
directly into the hands of consumers has opened up some new advertising categories resulting in a 
change of traditional viewing and programming distribution methods of the past. Broadcasting 
has to continue to evolve using new technologies and distribution methods to ensure that 
broadcast television’s one-to-many architecture successfully extend to emerging platforms 
(Ashworth, 2015). Because of the new forms of competition this is a critical time for cable 
operators and local broadcasters to work together to challenge the new program competitors. 
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Broadcasting has a bright future as long as local broadcasters can deliver programming in the 
public interest.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 The survey was sent to 658 local television station general managers in the United States. 
The return rate was 9.2%. The goal was to at least have a 30% return, which may have a deeper 
foundation for the findings of the survey. The researcher suggests the 9.2% return rate was due to 
general managers’ lack of knowledge of the retransmission consent process and a la carte cable 
pricing or because retransmission consent is handled at the corporate level. In addition, there were 
a low number of respondents from markets 1-25. Indications are that the larger markets 1-25 are 
not as reliant on retransmission fees as smaller markets 26-210, which may have contributed to 
the lower participation rate and could have had an affect on significance testing. In addition, 
researcher did not propose a neutral answer in the Likert-type scale that could have influenced 
some of the percentages.  
 Furthermore, many general managers declined to answer the survey questions; (i.e.) “My 
station’s target price per subscriber ranges from less than $0.50 cents per subscriber to more than 
$2 per subscriber” and “Price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in negotiating 
retransmission fees for my station”. Many general managers may have been reluctant to answer 
these questions because of corporate guidelines. It is also understood that general managers move 
from market to market and sharing this type of information could hinder their career. The low 
response rate could have hindered the results for these questions. 
 The study could have also been more focused on retransmission fees and the financial 
health of local broadcast stations or a la carte cable pricing. Although both of the issues are 
important to study, and they do relate to each other, a more focused approach may have resulted 
in more participation by general managers and a more comprehensive reflection of the industry.  
 Lastly, the subject of retransmission consent and the possibility of cable operators 
offering programming a la carte is an extremely toxic subject to the television industry. The 
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researcher tried to obtain endorsements from several industry groups, but due of the controversy 
surrounding the subject matter none of the groups were willing to endorse the survey. Cable 
operators, local television stations and industry groups all agree that these subjects are important 
to study due to new competition from stand-alone services and for the protection of consumers. 
Future studies should be conducted by respected industry organizations that can influence a 
greater participation by individuals involved in the retransmission negotiation process.  
Conclusion 
 Local broadcast stations are the backbone of the television industry. Government 
regulations are necessary to help local stations stay competitive in today’s marketplace. The 
retransmission consent negotiation process is important to local broadcasters because it gives 
them an opportunity to get paid for the programming they provide to local cable operators and 
because it generates revenue that helps pay expenses associated with serving the public interest. 
For the most part general managers agree retransmission fees add value to their station.  
 It is important for cable operators and local stations to work together to compete with the 
new direct-to-home services being brought to market today. Delivering programming a la carte 
may be the answer, but a shared revenue opportunity must be negotiated between cable operators 
and local broadcasters to stay competitive with new delivery platforms. Consumers are accessing 
video at a rapid pace. Millennials are leading the way, demanding what they want to watch, when 
they want to watch and on the delivery platform they choose.    
 This study also suggests that using Integrative Negotiation Theory as a way to bring cable 
operators and local broadcast stations together in an effort to provide better service to viewers and 
to stay competitive in the wide range of new programming service providers. Working together, 
cable operators and local broadcasters can address issues amicably and create a model for future 
negotiations that aim to benefit both parties mutually.
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Table 4 
Simple Main Effects Table for t-tests television markets 1-25/26-210. 
1. Retransmission fees have impacted my station’s financial health in a positive way.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 4.2000  1.09545 -.976  .146  .021 
26-210  41 4.6098    .86250       
2. Without retransmission fees, my station would suffer financially.      
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.0000    .00000 -2.186*  .313  .098 
26-210  41 4.2195  1.23516       
3. Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue projections.    
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 4.4000    .89443 .019  .003  .000 
26-210  41 4.3902  1.11530       
4. My station’s news and public service programming would be negatively affected     
without retransmission fees.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.0000  1.22474 -.996  .149  .022 
26-210  41 3.4146    .83593       
6. When negotiating retransmission fees, my station has a standard per subscriber dollar amount 
you are trying to achieve.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  4 3.7500  .95743  -.226  .037  .001 
26-210  36 3.8611  .93052        
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7. My station’s target price per subscriber ranges from….      
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  3 4.3333  .57735  .696  .133  .018 
26-210  26 4.0000  .80000         
8. Price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees for my station    
             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.8000  .83666  -.055  .008  .000 
26-210  41 3.8242  .94573        
9. Station ratings play an important role in determining the amount of retransmission 
compensation for my station.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.8000    .83666 .250  .038  .001 
26-210  41 2.6646  1.16808       
10. My station researches the market to determine a fair per subscriber price for my station’s 
retransmission compensation.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.8000    .83666 -.917  .137  .019 
26-210  41 3.3037  1.18659       
11. Station consolidation is affecting retransmission negotiations in my market.    
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.0000    .70711 .373  .056  .003 
26-210  41 2.7862  1.24821       
12. It is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission negotiations.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.4000  1.14018 -2.239*  .320  .102 
26-210  41 3.3962    .91683       
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14. Cable systems offering programming a la carte will have no effect on my station’s 
retransmission compensation.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2,4000  1.14018 -1.102  .164  .027 
26-210  41 2,9512  1.04765       
15. Negotiating retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte scenario will be 
significantly different for my station.        
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.2000    .83666 .054  .008  .000 
26-210  41 3.1707  1.15979      
16. My station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating retransmission fees with cable 
systems under an a la carte mandate.         
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.4000  1.14018 -.026  .004  .000 
26-210  41 3.4146  1.20365       
17. Local stations will have a greater negotiating position with cable systems under an a la carte 
scenario.            
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.6000  1.34164 .687  .103  .011 
26-210  41 3.2195  1.15135        
18. Low rated stations will have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte 
mandate.            
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.8000  .83666  -1.002  .149  .022 
26-210  41 3.2683  1.00061       
19. Variety of programming will affect my retransmission negotiations with cable systems. 
           
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.2000    .44721 .117  .018  .000 
26-210  41 3.1512    .90970      
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20. As delivery options change my station wants a retransmission solution that benefits both 
parties            
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.4000    .54772 -.784  .117  .014 
26-210  41 3.7224    .89423      
22.Retransmission fees impact the value of local television stations.     
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 4.2000  1.09545 -.044  .007  .000 
26-210  41 4.2195    .90863       
 
23. Under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value would be affected in a negative way. 
             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.0000  1.00000 .927  .138  .019 
26-210  41 2.5514  1.02352      
24. The financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission fees.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.0000  1.00000 -1.509  .222  .049 
26-210  41 3.8780  1.24890      
25. A la carte cable pricing would have a positive affect on my stations financial health.  
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.6000  .89443  -.535  .080  .006 
26-210  41 2.8484  .98874        
26. It would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la carte scenario.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 2.6000  .89443  -.374  .056  .003 
26-210  41 2.7736  .98615        
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27. My station is eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy with cable operators.  
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-25  5 3.2000  .44721  -.983  .147  .022 
26-210  41 3.6225  .94055        
*p<.05  **p<.01       
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Table 5  
Simple Main Effects Table for t-tests television markets 1-100/101-210. 
1. Retransmission fees have impacted my station’s financial health in a positive way.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 4.6786    .66964 1 .085  .161  .026 
101-210 18 4.3889  1.14475       
2. Without retransmission fees, my station would suffer financially.      
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 4.0000  1.12217 -.596  .089  .008 
101-210 18 4.2222  1.39560       
3. Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue projections.    
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 4.4286  1.03382 .288  .043  .002 
101-210 18 4.3333  1.18818       
4. My station’s news and public service programming would be negatively affected     
without retransmission fees.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.2143    .99469 -1.517  .223  .050 
101-210 18 3.6111    .60768       
6. When negotiating retransmission fees, my station has a standard per subscriber dollar amount 
you are trying to achieve.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  25 3.8800  .92736  .263  .043  .002 
101-210 15 3.8000  .94112        
7. My station’s target price per subscriber ranges from….      
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  18 4.0556  .87260  .183  .035  .001 
101-210 11 4.0000  .63246         
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8. Price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees for my station. 
             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.7857  .91721  -.324  .049  .002 
101-210 18 3.8774  .96322        
9. Station ratings play an important role in determining the amount of retransmission 
compensation for my station.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 2.8036  1.05488 .929  .139  .019 
101-210 18 2.4861  1.24402      
10. My station researches the market to determine a fair per subscriber price for my station’s 
retransmission compensation.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.2581  1.07473 .066  .010  .000 
101-210 18 3.2348  1.30742       
11. Station consolidation is affecting retransmission negotiations in my market.    
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.0532    .70711 1 .762  .257  .066 
101-210 18 2.4303  1.24821       
12. It is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission negotiations.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.2857  1.04906 -.019  .003  .000 
101-210 18 3.2914    .89218       
14. Cable systems offering programming a la carte will have no effect on my station’s 
retransmission compensation.          
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 2.7857  1.03126 -.841  .126  .016 
101-210 18 3.0556  1.10997       
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15. Negotiating retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte scenario will be 
significantly different for my station.         
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.2143  1.22798 .301  .045  .002 
101-210 18 3.1111    .96338       
16. My station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating retransmission fees with cable 
systems under an a la carte mandate.         
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.4643  1.17006 -.362  .055  .003 
101-210 18 3.3333  1.23669       
17. Local stations will have a greater negotiating position with cable systems under an a la carte 
scenario.            
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.2500  1.23603 -.078  .012  .000 
101-210 18 3.2778  1.07406        
18. Low rated stations will have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an a la carte 
mandate.            
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.1429    .89087 -.635  .095  .009 
101-210 18 3.3333  1.13759       
19. Variety of programming will affect my retransmission negotiations with cable systems. 
             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.1857    .77159 .282  .042  .002 
101-210 18 3.1111  1.02262       
20. As delivery options change my station wants a retransmission solution that benefits both 
parties             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.6650    .81654 -.217  .033  .001 
101-210 18 3.7222    .95828       
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22.Retransmission fees impact the value of local television stations.     
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 4.2857    .89679 .626  .094  .009 
101-210 18 4.1111    .96338      
23. Under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value would be affected in a negative way. 
             
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 2.6289  1.02373 .809  .035  .001 
101-210 18 2.5556  1.04162       
24. The financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission fees.    
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.5357  1.37389 -1.712  .250  .062 
101-210 18 4.1667    .92355       
25. A la carte cable pricing would have a positive affect on my stations financial health.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 2.6708    .81679 -1.320  .195  .038 
101-210 18 3.0556  1.16175       
26. It would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la carte scenario.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 2.5613    .83204 -1.724  .251  .063 
101-210 18 3.0556  1.10997        
27. My station is eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy with cable operators.   
  n M  SD  t  η  η2  
1-100  28 3.5186    .73889 -.536  .081  .006 
101-210 18 3.6667  1.13759       
*p<.05  **p<.01       
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Table 6           One-Way ANOVA Tables 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
Table 1 
 1. Retransmission fees have impacted my station’s financial health in a positive way. 
   N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  4.7  .724 
 NBC    9  4.8  .667 
 CBS  11  4.3             1.272 
 FOX    9  4.9  .333      
 Total  44  4.6  .839      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for retransmission fees have impacted my station’s financial health in 
a positive way.           
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between 2.22     3 .741  1.1 .271 .074 
 Within             27.96   40 .699      
 Total             30.18   43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
2.  Without retransmission fees, my station would suffer financially.    
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.9              1.458 
 NBC    9  3.7              1.414 
 CBS  11  4.4                .924 
 FOX    9  4.7  .667      
 Total  44  4.1              1.231      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for without retransmission fees, my station would suffer financially.  
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between 7.35     3 2.45  1.7 .336 .113 
 Within             57.83   40 1.45      
 Total             65.18   43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
3. Retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue projections.   
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  4.6                .828 
 NBC    9  4.1              1.364 
 CBS  11  4.5                .934 
 FOX    9  4.5              1.333      
 Total  44  4.5              1.067      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for retransmission fees are important to my station’s annual revenue 
projections           
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.47   3   .490   .413 .173 .030 
 Within             47.44   40 1.186      
 Total             48.91   43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
4. My station’s news and public service programming would be negatively affected 
 without retransmission fees         
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.5                .915 
 NBC    9  3.6                .527 
 CBS  11  3.4                .809 
 FOX    9  3.3              1.000      
 Total  44  3.4                .818      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for my station’s news and public service programming would be 
negatively affected without retransmission fees.       
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between               .29   3   .098   .138 .101 .010  
 Within             28.50   40   .713      
 Total             28.79   43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
6. When negotiating retransmission fees, my station has a standard per subscriber 
 dollar amount you are trying to achieve.       
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  14  3.7               1.069 
 NBC    9  4.1                 .782 
 CBS    8  3.8                 .886 
 FOX    7  4.1                 .899      
 Total  38  3.9                 .924      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for negotiating retransmission fees, my station has a standard per 
subscriber amount you are trying to achieve.       
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.48   3   .492   .556 .216 .047 
 Within             30.10              34   .885      
 Total             31.58              37       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
7. My station’s target price per subscriber ranges from      
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  11  4.3                .505 
 NBC    4  3.8                .500 
 CBS    8  3.8              1.281 
 FOX    6  4.0                .000      
 Total  29  4.0                .778      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for my station’s target price per subscriber ranges from   
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            2.17   3   .723  1.22  .358 .128 
 Within             14.79              25   .592      
 Total             16.97              28       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
8. Price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees for 
 my station.           
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.8                .941 
 NBC    9  4.1              1.167 
 CBS  11  3.7                .900 
 FOX    9  3.8                .833      
 Total  44  3.8                .938      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for price per subscriber is the primary difficulty in negotiating 
retransmission fees for my station.        
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            .910   3   .303   .328 .155 .024 
 Within             36.95              40   .924      
 Total             37.86              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
9. Station ratings play an important role in determining the amount of retransmission 
 compensation for my station.         
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  2.8              1.207 
 NBC    9  2.2              1.092 
 CBS  11  2.8              1.072 
 FOX    9  2.8              1.301      
 Total  44  2.7              1.153      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for station ratings play an important role in determining the amount of 
retransmission compensation for my station.       
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            2.23   3   .744   .541 .197 .039 
 Within             55.01              40 1.357      
 Total             57.24              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
10. My station researches the market to determine a fair per subscriber price for my 
 station’s retransmission compensation.       
   N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.3              1.290 
 NBC    9  3.2              1.199 
 CBS  11  2.8              1.085 
 FOX    9  3.8                .972      
 Total  44  3.3              1.167      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for my station researches the market to determine a fair per subscriber 
price for m station’s retransmission compensation.     
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            4.42   3 1.474  1.089 .2.75 .076 
 Within             54.16              40 1.354      
 Total             58.58              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
11. Station consolidation if affecting retransmission negotiations in my market.   
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.4              1.056 
 NBC    9  2.6              1.404 
 CBS  11  2.5              1.206 
 FOX    9  2.4              1.130      
 Total  44  2.8              1.218      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for station consolidation is affecting retransmission negotiations in my 
market.            
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            7.69   3 2.562  1.826 .347 .120 
 Within             56.14              40 1.403      
 Total             63.83              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
12. It is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission negotiations.  
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.4                .910 
 NBC    9  3.6              1.130 
 CBS  11  3.2                .872 
 FOX    9  3.1              1.167      
 Total  44  3.3                 .982      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for it is important that my station avoids conflict during retransmission 
negotiations.           
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.14   3   .378   .375 .165 .027 
 Within             40.31              40 1.008      
 Total             41.45              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
14. Cable systems offering programming a la carte will have no effect on my station’s 
 retransmission compensation.        
   N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.2                .884 
 NBC    9  3.0              1.118 
 CBS  11  3.0              1.265 
 FOX    9  2.1                .782      
 Total  44  2.9              1.074      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for cable systems offering programming a la carte will have no effect 
on my stations retransmission compensation.       
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            7.81   3 2.605  2.491 .397 .157 
 Within             41.82              40 1.046      
 Total             49.64              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
15. Negotiating retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte scenario 
 will be significantly different for my station.       
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.1              1.032 
 NBC    9  3.3              1.224 
 CBS  11  3.4              1.361 
 FOX    9  3.2                .833      
 Total  44  3.2              1.096      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for negotiating retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la 
carte scenario will be significantly different for my station.     
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between               .69   3   .231   .181 .116 .013 
 Within             51.03              40 1.276      
 Total             51.73              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
16. My station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating retransmission fees 
 with cable systems under an a la carte mandate.      
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.4              1.298 
 NBC    9  3.9              1.364 
 CBS  11  3.5                .934 
 FOX    9  3.3                .866      
 Total  44  3.5              1.131      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for my station’s ratings will be extremely important in negotiating 
retransmission fees with cable systems under an a la carte mandate.    
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.78   3   .595   .477 .180 .032 
 Within             52.22              40 1.330      
 Total             55.00              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
17. Local stations will have a greater negotiating position with cable systems under an 
 a la carte scenario.          
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.3              1.345 
 NBC    9  3.6              1.236 
 CBS  11  3.1              1.136 
 FOX    9  3.2                .972      
 Total  44  3.3              1.173      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for local stations will have a greater negotiating position with cable 
systems under an a la carte scenario.        
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.14   3   .380   .262 .139 .019 
 Within             58.02              40  1.451      
 Total             59.16              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
18. Low rated stations will have difficulty in negotiating retransmission fees under an 
 a la carte mandate.          
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.0                .845 
 NBC    9  3.6              1.130 
 CBS  11  3.5                .934 
 FOX    9  3.2              1.093      
 Total  44  3.3                .973      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for low rated stations will have difficulty in negotiating retransmission 
fees under an a la carte mandate.        
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            2.22   3   .741   .769  .234 .055 
 Within             38.51              40   .963      
 Total             40.73              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
19. Variety of programming will affect my retransmission negotiations with cable 
 systems.           
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.3                .816 
 NBC    9  3.2                .662 
 CBS  11  2.9              1.044 
 FOX    9  3.3                .707      
 Total  44  3.2                .823      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for variety of programming will affect my retransmission negotiations 
with cable systems.          
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.37   3   .457   .659 .217 .047 
 Within             27.75              40   .694      
 Total             29.12              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
20. As delivery options change my station wants a retransmission solution that  benefits 
both parties.          
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  4.0                .926 
 NBC    9  3.8                .785 
 CBS  11  3.4                .674 
 FOX    9  3.7                .866      
 Total  44  3.7                .838      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for as delivery options change my station wants a retransmission 
solution that benefits both parties.        
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            2.72   3   .908  1.321 .300 .090 
 Within             27.48              40   .687      
 Total             30.20              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
22. Retransmission fees impact the value of local television stations.    
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  4.1                .990 
 NBC    9  4.1                .928 
 CBS  11  4.1                .874 
 FOX    9  4.5                .882      
 Total  44  4.2                .912      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for retransmission fees impact the value of local television stations.  
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.25   3   .415   .482 .187 .035 
 Within             34.48              40   .862      
 Total             35.73              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
23. Under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value would be affected in a negative 
 way.           
   N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  2.5                .915 
 NBC    9  2.4                .995 
 CBS  11  2.6                .820 
 FOX    9  3.1              1.269      
 Total  44  2.6                .992      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for under an a la carte scenario, a local station’s value would be 
affected in a negative way.         
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            3.01   3 1.002  1.021 .267 .071 
 Within             39.27              40   .982      
 Total             42.28              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
24. The financial health of local television stations relies on retransmission fees.  
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.8              1.125 
 NBC    9  3.6              1.414 
 CBS  11  4.1              1.044 
 FOX    9  3.8              1.394      
 Total  44  3.9              1.193      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for the financial health of local television stations relies on 
retransmission fees.          
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between              .98   3   .328   .218 .127 .016 
 Within             60.20              40 1.505      
 Total             61.18              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
25. A la carte cable pricing would have a positive affect on my station’s financial 
 health.            
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  2.9              1.060 
 NBC    9  2.9                .601 
 CBS  11  2.6              1.021 
 FOX    9  3.1              1.167      
 Total  44  2.9                .979      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for a la carte cable pricing would have a positive affect on my 
station’s financial health.         
  Sum of Squares  f Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.23   3   .409   .410 .173 .030 
 Within             39.94              40   .999      
 Total             41.17              43       
 *p < .05 
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Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
26. It would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la carte scenario.  
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  2.8              1.082 
 NBC    9  2.8                .667 
 CBS  11  2.5                .924 
 FOX    9  3.1              1.167      
 Total  44  2.8                .978      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for it would be easier to negotiate retransmission fees under an a la 
carte scenario.           
  Sum of Squares  df Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            1.73   3   .578   .587 .205 .042 
 Within             39.39              40   .985      
 Total             41.12              43       
 *p < .05 
 
Descriptive Statistics Table for network affiliation. 
 
Table 1 
27. My station is eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy with cable 
 operators.           
  N  M  SD      
 ABC  15  3.7              1.112 
 NBC    9  3.8                .789 
 CBS  11  3.2                .405 
 FOX    9  3.9                .928      
 Total  44  3.6                .890      
 
Table 2 
One-Way ANOVA for my station is eager to employ a win-win retransmission strategy 
with cable operators.          
  Sum of Squares  f Mean Squares F η η2  
 Between            3.21   3 1.071  1.389 .307 .094 
 Within             30.85              40   .771      
 Total             34.06              43       
 *p < .05 
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